Another development in the mid twentieth century with a
huge import for the development of cognitive psychology was the opening up of a
new field concerned with the possibility of designing and then building computers.
Building on earlier work that developed a formal, or mathematical approach to
logical reasoning, Claude Shannon in 1938 showed how core aspects of reasoning
could be implemented in simple electrical circuits.
In the 1940s, McCulloch and Pitts showed how it was possible to model the behaviour of simple (and idealized) neurons in terms of logic. Taken together, these developments suggested something that at the time seemed extraordinary – that the brain’s activity could, at least in principle, be implemented by simple electrical circuits. In parallel with these developments, the 1930s and 1940s saw pioneering theoretical developments in computation and information processing.
Turing, in 1936, developed an abstract specification for a machine (a Turing machine) that could compute any function that in principle could be computed. In the 1940s, Shannon and Weaver used the tools of mathematics to propose a formal account of information, and of how it could be transmitted. Technological progress was also rapid. In 1941, Konrad Zuse of Berlin developed the world’s first programmable, general-purpose computer.
In 1943, Colossus, a special-purpose computer designed to break wartime codes, became operational at Bletchley Park, in Buckinghamshire. In 1946, John von Neumann articulated a set of architectural proposals for designing programmable, generalpurpose computers. These were adopted almost universally and computers have since also been known as von Neumann machines. In 1948, the Manchester University Mark I programmable, general-purpose computer became operational and, in 1951, Ferranti Ltd began producing, selling and installing versions of the Manchester Mark I – the world’s first commercially available, programmable, general-purpose computer.
These developments, fascinating though they were in their own right, also seemed to carry important implications for our understanding and study of the mind. They appeared to show, for instance, that reasoning, a central feature of the human mind, could be implemented in a digital computer. If that were the case, then not only could the computer be used as a tool to aid our understanding of the mind, but the question would also arise as to whether minds and computers are essentially alike. Indeed, in 1950, Turing proposed a test – the Turing test – by which he thought we should judge whether two entities have the same intelligence.
Turing believed that, should the situation ever arise whereby we could not distinguish the intelligence of a human from the ‘intelligence’ of a computer, then we ought to concede that both were equally intelligent. Moreover, since we are in agreement that humans are capable of thought, we also ought to concede that computers are also capable of thought! Box 1.4 (overleaf) outlines the Turing test and considers what it might take for it to be passed. Turing’s position remains controversial, of course, though it certainly captured the imagination of the time. In 1956, at the Dartmouth Conference (held in Dartmouth, New Hampshire), John MCCARTHY COINED THE PHRASE ‘ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE’ (OR AI).
In the 1940s, McCulloch and Pitts showed how it was possible to model the behaviour of simple (and idealized) neurons in terms of logic. Taken together, these developments suggested something that at the time seemed extraordinary – that the brain’s activity could, at least in principle, be implemented by simple electrical circuits. In parallel with these developments, the 1930s and 1940s saw pioneering theoretical developments in computation and information processing.
Turing, in 1936, developed an abstract specification for a machine (a Turing machine) that could compute any function that in principle could be computed. In the 1940s, Shannon and Weaver used the tools of mathematics to propose a formal account of information, and of how it could be transmitted. Technological progress was also rapid. In 1941, Konrad Zuse of Berlin developed the world’s first programmable, general-purpose computer.
In 1943, Colossus, a special-purpose computer designed to break wartime codes, became operational at Bletchley Park, in Buckinghamshire. In 1946, John von Neumann articulated a set of architectural proposals for designing programmable, generalpurpose computers. These were adopted almost universally and computers have since also been known as von Neumann machines. In 1948, the Manchester University Mark I programmable, general-purpose computer became operational and, in 1951, Ferranti Ltd began producing, selling and installing versions of the Manchester Mark I – the world’s first commercially available, programmable, general-purpose computer.
These developments, fascinating though they were in their own right, also seemed to carry important implications for our understanding and study of the mind. They appeared to show, for instance, that reasoning, a central feature of the human mind, could be implemented in a digital computer. If that were the case, then not only could the computer be used as a tool to aid our understanding of the mind, but the question would also arise as to whether minds and computers are essentially alike. Indeed, in 1950, Turing proposed a test – the Turing test – by which he thought we should judge whether two entities have the same intelligence.
Turing believed that, should the situation ever arise whereby we could not distinguish the intelligence of a human from the ‘intelligence’ of a computer, then we ought to concede that both were equally intelligent. Moreover, since we are in agreement that humans are capable of thought, we also ought to concede that computers are also capable of thought! Box 1.4 (overleaf) outlines the Turing test and considers what it might take for it to be passed. Turing’s position remains controversial, of course, though it certainly captured the imagination of the time. In 1956, at the Dartmouth Conference (held in Dartmouth, New Hampshire), John MCCARTHY COINED THE PHRASE ‘ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE’ (OR AI).
He founded AI labs at MIT in 1957, and then at Stanford
in 1963, and so began a new academic discipline, predicated on the possibility
that humans are not the only ones capable of exhibiting human-like
intelligence. You have now been introduced to a variety of the influences that
go to make up cognitive psychology.
Cognitive psychology inherits some of the behaviourist concerns with scientific method. Throughout this book you will see that almost constant reference is made to systematic observations of human behaviour (and sometimes animal behaviour too). Almost every chapter will present the results of empirical investigations, and these are fundamental in guiding our understanding. But cognitive psychology rejects the exclusive focus on what is observable. As Chomsky implied, understanding the mind requires us to consider what lies behind behaviour – to ask what rules or processes govern the behaviour we observe.
Each chapter will also consider the extent to which we understand how the mind processes information, and how that information is represented. Cognitive psychology also has a major commitment to the use of computers as a device for aiding our understanding of the mind. First, computers are used as research equipment to control experiments, to present stimuli, to record responses and to tabulate and analyse data. Second, computers are also used as a research tool – if we can implement reasoning in a computer, for example, we may gain insight into how reasoning might be implemented in the brain.
Cognitive psychology inherits some of the behaviourist concerns with scientific method. Throughout this book you will see that almost constant reference is made to systematic observations of human behaviour (and sometimes animal behaviour too). Almost every chapter will present the results of empirical investigations, and these are fundamental in guiding our understanding. But cognitive psychology rejects the exclusive focus on what is observable. As Chomsky implied, understanding the mind requires us to consider what lies behind behaviour – to ask what rules or processes govern the behaviour we observe.
Each chapter will also consider the extent to which we understand how the mind processes information, and how that information is represented. Cognitive psychology also has a major commitment to the use of computers as a device for aiding our understanding of the mind. First, computers are used as research equipment to control experiments, to present stimuli, to record responses and to tabulate and analyse data. Second, computers are also used as a research tool – if we can implement reasoning in a computer, for example, we may gain insight into how reasoning might be implemented in the brain.
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